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H~ctor Gros Espiell* Reservations and Declarations
in the Additional Protocols
to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
I.
1. It is common knowledge that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, prohibits
reservations (Article 27), as does Additional Protocol 2 (Article 4). As
for Protocol I, the fact that no mention is made of such a prohibition has
been construed as meaning that such reservations are permissible'.
2. Against this background, the following situations have arisen to date:
i. Declarations of various types have been made on signing and/or
ratifying the Treaty: a. Declarations waiving the requirements laid down
in Article 28, paragraph 1 (28.2), entailing automatic entry into force of
the Treaty. Thus far, twenty-one states have proceeded in this way.2 All
these declarations waive the requirements set forth in Article 28 (1) and,
with two exceptions, were made when depositing the instrument of
ratification. The exceptions are Colombia, which ratified on August 4
1972, and waived the requirements on September 6 1972, and Trinidad
and Tobago, which ratified on December 3 1970, but only submitted the
*Professor of International Law at the University of Montevideo, Judge at the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, formerly General Secretary of the Organisation for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL). The bibliography on the Treaty of Tlatelolco
is too extensive to be referred to here in full. The bulk can be found in the notes to earlier
articles of mine, as listed in the end-notes. I would, however, like to give special mention to
two excellent studies which have been published more recently: Holger Mirek:
Voranssetzungen Entwicklung und Problemer regionalier Kernwaffenfteiheit in Latinamerika;
Verlag Breitenbach Publishers, Saarbrucken, 1986 (with an exhaustive bibliography, pp. 424-
500), and R. St. J. Macdonald, Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones and Principles of International
Law, in International Law and its Sources, Liber Amicorum Maarten Bos, edited by Wybo P.
Heere, Kluwer. On the nuclear weapon-free zone in the South Pacific, structured along similar
lines to the Tlatelolco system (on the basis of a regional Treaty, the Treaty of Raratonga, of the
6th of August 1985, and two Additional Protocols), see Roderick Alley; Nuclear Weapon-Free
Zones: the South Pacific Proposal; The Stanley Foundation, occasional paper, Grey E.
Fry; The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone, SIPRI Yearbook, 1986; Joseph Goldblat and
Sverre Lodgaard, Comparison of arms control commitments in the Treaty of Raratonga and the
Treaty of Tlatelolco, SIPRI Yearbook, 1986.
1. I have already studied this question, especially in El derecho de los Tratados y el Tratado
de Tlatelolco; OPANAL, Mexico, 1974; pp. 2 5-2 6.
2. The Bahamas, Barbados, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Granada,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Dominican Republic, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
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declaration of waiver on June 27 1975. Two states, Brazil and Chile,
despite having ratified the Treaty, have not yet made the declaration
waiving the Article 28 requirements.
b) Other types of declaration: Argentina, on signing (September 27,
1967), made a declaration concerning the peaceful use of nuclear energy
and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Brazil, on signing (May 9,
1967), and on ratifying without waiver on January 29 1968, made a
declaration concerning the interpretation of Article 18 of the Treaty.
Nicaragua, on signing on February 15 1967 made a declaration on the
peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes,
and the transport of nuclear material over territory. Venezuela, ratifying
with a waiver on March 23 1970, made a declaration referring to Articles
25(2) and 28(1) and to its dispute with Guyana.
ii) The following declarations have been made with regard to the
second Protocok a) China, when signing on August 21 1973; b) The
United States, when signing and ratifying on April 1st 1968 and May 12
1971 respectively; c) France, on signing on July 18 1973 and on ratifying
the Treaty (March 22 1974 and April 15 1974); d) The United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on signing the Treaty on December
20 1967 and on ratifying it on December 11 1969; e) The Soviet Union,
on signing (May 18 1978) and on ratifying (December 12 1978).
iii) The situation as regards the first Protocol is as follows: a) The
United Kingdom made a declaration on signing the Treaty on December
20 1967, which it reiterated on ratifying (December 11, 1969); b) The
Netherlands, on signing on March 15 1968 and on ratifying on July 26
1971; c) The United States, on signing on May 26 1977, made no
declaration. It made a declaration in 1981 on ratification; d) France
made a declaration and entered a reservation on signing on March 2
1979. France has not yet ratified the Treaty.
II.
3. I do not propose to examine the various declarations made when
signing and/or ratifying the Treaty. I will only deal with the reservations
and declarations concerning the two Protocols that were made when they
were signed or ratified. This analysis is not only of legal interest since, as
we shall see, the reservations or declarations made by the Powers on
signing or ratifying the two Protocols clearly have a political significance:
they reveal the aims and principles of those countries' foreign policy and,
more particularly, their approach to issues directly related to international
disarmament and security.
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III.
4. Article 23, paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties states: "If formulated when signing the Treaty subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval, a reservation must be formally
confirmed by the reserving State when expressing its consent to be bound
by the Treaty. In such a case the reservation shall be considered as having
been made on the date of its confirmation".
The foregoing rule explains why the United States, with regard to
Protocol II, the United Kingdom, with regard to protocols I and II,
France, in connection with Protocol II, and the Netherlands, on Protocol
I, reiterated, confirmed or extended the declarations made on signing.
While they did not formally call these declarations reservations -
although they are genuine reservations in some instances, by virtue of
their content, nature or purpose - they set out, by reiterating or
confirming them - to preclude any possibility of them ceasing to achieve
their full effect. That explains the importance they attached to them and
how, although they did not call them reservations as such, in order not to
clash with Article 29 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and Article 4 of Protocol
II, they dealt with them in the manner expressly prescribed by
international law in the matter of reservations (the need for reiteration or
confirmation). Only China did not reiterate on ratifying the declaration
it had made on signing, which proves the exclusively political nature of
such declarations, clearly designed to have quite a different effect from
that of a declaration.
IV.
5. We can classify declarations made on signing and/or ratifying Protocol
II into two groups. The first group is exemplified by the declaration made
by the People's Republic of China on signing this Protocol on August 23
1973. It is a strictly political declaration which does not deal with any
interpretation problem concerning either the Treaty or its Protocols. It
simply restates, in a more systematic manner, China's foreign policy
guidelines and viewpoints, especially with regard to the international
situation of the Superpowers, relations between China and the
developing countries, and disarmament. The declaration states:
"Latin American countries proposed the establishment of a denuclearized
zone in Latin America, in order to oppose the policy of nuclear threat and
blackmail of the Superpowers and in order to preserve peace and security
in Latin America. The Chinese Government respects and supports this
rightful position, and, at the request of Mexico and other Latin American
countries, has resolved to sign the second Protocol to the Treaty for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, on August 211973, in
Mexico City.
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"The Chinese Government has always stood for the complete
prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and maintains
that, as the first step, all nuclear countries should first of all undertake not
to use nuclear weapons, particularly not use them against non-nuclear
countries and nuclear weapon-free zones. The Chinese Government has
repeatedly declared that at no time and in no circumstances will China be
the first to use nuclear weapons. On behalf of the Chinese Government,
China's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chi Peng-fei gave a specific
undertaking in regard to the nuclear weapon-free zone in Latin America
on 14 November 1972. The Chinese Government will now reiterate this
undertaking: China will never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear Latin American countries and the Latin American
nuclear weapon-free zone; nor will China test, manufacture, produce,
stockpile, install or deploy nuclear weapons in these countries or in this
zone, or send her means of transportation and delivery carrying nuclear
weapons to cross the territory, territorial sea or air space of Latin
American countries.
"It is necessary to point out that the signing of Additional Protocol II to
the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America by
the Chinese Government does not imply any change whatsoever in
China's principle stand on the disarmament and nuclear weapons issue,
and, in particular, does not affect the Chinese Government's consistent
stand against the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the
partial nuclear test ban treaty. Certain countries which possess substantial
nuclear stockpiles use these two treaties to establish their own nuclear
monopoly, superiority and hegemony over the world. China finds itself
totally compelled to develop its own nuclear weapons for the sole purpose
of defending itself, in order to break the nuclear monopoly and ultimately
to eradicate all nuclear weapons.
"In the opinion of the Chinese Government, it is noteworthy that at the
present time the super-Powers, which have at their disposal vast stockpiles
of nuclear weapons, are intensifying their nuclear arms race and
competing for spheres of influence behind the smoke screen of d6tente -
all of which is a grave threat to the peace and security of non-nuclear
countries and denuclearized zones.
"The Chinese Government holds that, in order that Latin America may
truly become a nuclear weapon-free zone, all nuclear countries, and
particularly the super-Powers, which possess huge numbers of nuclear
weapons, must first of all undertake earnestly not to use nuclear weapons
against the Latin American countries and the Latin American nuclear
weapon-free zone, and they must be asked to undertake to observe and
implement the following: (1) dismantling of all foreign military bases in
Latin America and refraining from establishing any new foreign military
bases there; (2) prohibition of the passage of any means of transportation
and delivery carrying nuclear weapons through Latin American territory,
territorial sea or air space.
"The Chinese Government hopes that the Latin American countries
will strengthen their unity and advance hand in hand in the struggle
against the super-Powers' policy of nuclear threat and blackmail, and for
the establishment of the denuclearized zone in Latin America. The
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Chinese Government, together with the countries of Latin America and
with all peace-loving countries, is prepared to pursue its tireless efforts to
attain the ultimate objective of total prohibition and complete destruction
of nuclear weapons in the world".3
In the declaration made by the Soviet Union on ratifying this Protocol
on December 12 1978, a similar, strictly political, sentence was included
which compounded the earlier points made in the declaration on signing
the Protocol on May 18 1978, and the supplementary statement
contained in the ratification document. This declaration, of a wholly
political character, to be found in paragraph 2 of the ratification
declaration, reads as follows: "Moreover, the Soviet Union reaffirms its
position with respect to the granting of independence to colonial
countries and peoples, in accordance with the United Nations
Declaration on this question (General Assembly resolution 1415 (XV) of
14 December 1960)."
This Soviet declaration is significant, since several territories situated
within the zone of application of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, belonging to
the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands, and to
which the statute defined in Protocol applies, may be considered to be
subject to a colonial regime and hence to be concerned by Resolution
1514 (XV). This is the case with the territories listed by the
Decolonisation Commission, for example, Puerto Rico and several
Caribbean islands in ihe possession of Great Britain, as well as the
Falkland Islands (Malvinas). As for the French or Dutch territories, the
fact that they are not mentioned in the list does not imply that the Soviet
declaration has no bearing on any de jure or de facto jurisdiction to
which they are subject.
As these political declarations clearly do not constitute reservations to
the Treaty of Tlatelolco, their legality cannot be discussed. They
obviously do not "set out to exclude or modify the legal effects of certain
provisions of the treaty in their application to that particular State"
(Article 2d of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). They
merely state general or specific policy principles with regard to the
international situation, in connection with the real or potential field of
application of the Treaty.
6. In the second group of declarations we find, for example, those
made by the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and the USSR
(apart from that already mentioned in the previous paragraph) at the time
of signing and/or ratifying Protocol II.
3. H&tor Gros Espiell, La signature du Traitd de Tlatelolco par la Chine et la France, in
Annuaire du droit International 1973, pp. 138-140.
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All these declarations have in common the fact that they state a
particular interpretation of one or several of the provisions of the Treaty
of Tlatelolco, with regard to the extension of the obligations assumed by
them on becoming parties to Protocol II, or concerning the way in which
the requirements under the Treaty of Tlatelolco are to be reconciled with
international law in general. In certain instances, which I shall specify
later on, these interpretative declarations are tantamount, by nature if not
in name, to actual reservations. I have already pointed out, however, that
reservations are not permitted under Protocol II and I have already
analysed, in an earlier article, the legal problem raised whenever
declarations are made which possess the character of reservations, even if
they are not named as such4.
I do not propose to re-examine the strictly legal aspect of this problem,
but simply to point out that, according to the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, it is not the "terms or title" which determine whether or
not a "unilateral declaration" is in actual fact a reservation, but whether
or not its purpose is to "exclude or modify the legal effects of certain
provisions of the treaty in their application to that particular State"
(Article 2.d)5.Since it is obvious that in some cases the declarations made
at the time of signing and/or ratifying Additional Protocol II, despite
their title, do exhibit this purpose or objective, I shall, by a study of the
declarations made by the states party to that Protocol, advert to instances
where some of them may constitute genuine reservations.
Interestingly, the Depositary Government, that is, the Government of
Mexico (Article 26, paragraphs 2 and 3), has never to date raised any
objection or made any observation on this matter when receiving the
signature or instrument of ratification to Additional Protocol II. Nor has
the issue been raised by any of the states party to the Treaty or the
Protocols, with the result that no debate has ever been held on this matter
by the parties themselves to these international instruments.
V.
7. The first country to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II was the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which made the
following declaration on signing, on December 20 1967:
4. See Las "declaraciones interpretativas" y el Tratado de Tlatelolco, in El Tratado de
Tlatelolco: algunas consideraciones sobre aspectos especificos; OPANAL, Mexico, 1976,
pp. 41-51.
5. See the study by Ernesto J. Rey Caro: Las reservas en la Convencidn de Viena de 1969
sobre el Derecho de los Tratados; Universidad Nacional de Cordoba, 1977, pp. 6-9, written
after my study quoted in note 1, which reaches the same conclusions.
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"On depositing the instruments of ratification, the Government of the
United Kingdom declared it to be their understanding that: (a) The
reference in Article 3 of the Treaty to "its own legislation" relates only to
such legislation as is compatible with the rules of international law and as
involves an exercise of sovereignty consistent with those rules, and
accordingly that signature or ratification of either Additional Protocol by
the Government of the United Kingdom could not be regarded as
implying recognition of any legislation which did not, in their view,
comply with the relevant rules of international law; (b) Article 18 of the
Treaty, when read in conjunction with Articles 1 and 5 thereof, would not
permit the Contracting Parties to the Treaty to carry out explosions of
nuclear devices for peaceful purposes unless and until advances in
technology have made possible the development of devices for such
explosions which are not capable of being used for weapons purposes; (c)
signature or ratification of either Additional Protocol by the Government
of the United Kingdom could not be regarded as affecting in any way the
legal status of any territory for the international relations of which they are
responsible lying within the limits of the geographical zone established by
the Treaty; and (d) the Government of the United Kingdom would, in the
event of any act of aggression by a Contracting Party to the Treaty in
which that party was supported by a nuclear-weapon State, be free to
reconsider the extent to which they could be regarded as committed by the
provisions of Additional Protocol II. I have the honour further to declare
that the Government of the United Kingdom are prepared to regard their
undertaking under Article 3 of Additional Protocol II not to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties to the
Treaty as extending not only to those Parties but also to territories in
respect of which the undertaking to apply the statute of denuclearisation,
in accordance with Article 1 of Additional Protocol I, becomes effective".
On ratifying the two Additional Protocols, on the 1 1th of December
1969, the United Kingdom reiterated the declaration it had made on
signing and informed the Depositary Government that, as concerns the
Additional Protocol I: "(... ) the ratification includes the Associated
States of Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla,
St. Lucia and St. Vincent, and the territories of the Bahamas, British
Honduras, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands,
Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands". It further stated that:
"The Government of the United Kingdom have always believed that the
establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America would be a most
useful step towards non-proliferation and the building up of international
confidence. While warmly welcoming the achievement of the States
concerned in setting up the organs of the Treaty, Her Majesty's
Government note with regret that the Treaty is not yet in force in a
number of important States in the area. The Government of the United
Kingdom therefore hope that the deposit of their instruments of
ratification of the Additional Protocols to the Treaty will serve as an
encouragement both to other nuclear-weapon States to recognize the
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Treaty and to those Latin American States which have not yet done so, to
bring the Treaty into force in their territory".
These declarations by the United Kingdom on signing and ratifying the
two Additional Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco are of particular
importance: as they were the first to be made they highlighted those
points on which nuclear-weapon powers or extra-continental countries
with territories administered de jure or de facto by them, deemed it
necessary, worthwhile or appropriate to express their viewpoints, or lay
down their principles. To that extent, the British declarations are the
source of many viewpoints expressed in subsequent declarations. I will
come later to the similarities or discrepancies between later declarations
and the United Kingdom declaration. Furthermore, as these declarations
were drafted for the simultaneous signing and ratification by Great
Britain of Protocols I and II, they refer to both these instruments.
8. The second country to sign Additional Protocol II was the United
States, on April 1st 1968, on which occasion the Government of the
United States made the following declaration:
"The United States understands that the Treaty and its Protocols have
no effect upon the international status of territorial claims.
"The United States takes note of the Preparatory Commission's
interpretation of the Treaty, as set forth in the Final Act, that, governed by
the principles and rules of international law, each of the Contracting
Parties retains exclusive power and legal competence, unaffected by the
terms of the Treaty, to grant or deny non-Contracting Parties transit and
transport privileges.
"As regards the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol II not to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties, the
United States would have to consider that an armed attack by a
Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon State,
would be incompatible with the corresponding obligations under Article 1
of the Treaty.
"The United States wishes to point out again the fact that the
technology of making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is
indistinguishable from the technology of making nuclear weapons and the
fact that nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for peaceful
purposes are both capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled
manner and have the common group of characteristics of large amounts of
energy generated instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore we
understand the definition contained in Article 5 of the Treaty as
necessarily encompassing all nuclear explosive devices. It is our
understanding that Articles 1 and 5 restrict accordingly the activities of the
Contracting Parties under paragraph 1 of Article 18.
"The United States further notes that paragraph 4 of Article 18 of the
Treaty permits, and that United States adherence to Protocol II will not
prevent, collaboration by the United States with Contracting Parties for
the purpose of carrying out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful
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purposes in a manner consistent with our policy of not contributing to the
proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this connection, the
United States reaffirms its willingness to make available nuclear explosion
services for peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory basis under
appropriate international arrangements and to join other nuclear-weapon
States in a commitment to do so.
"The United States also wishes to state that, although not required by
Protocol II, it will act with respect to such territories of Protocol I
adherents as are within the geographical area defined in paragraph 2 of
Article 4 of the Treaty in the same way as Protocol II requires it to act
with respect to the territories of Contracting Parties".
When the United States ratified this Protocol two years later, on May
12, 1971, it made the following declaration:
"The United States Government understands the reference in Article 3
of the Treaty to "its own legislation" to relate only to such legislation as
is compatible with the rules of international law and as involves an
exercise of sovereignty consistent with those rules, and accordingly that
ratification of Additional Protocol II by the United States Government
could not be regarded as implying recognition, for the purpose of this
Treaty and its Protocols, or for any other purpose, of any legislation which
did not, in the view of the United States, comply with the relevant rules
of international law.
"The United States Government takes note of the preparatory
commission's interpretation of the Treaty, as set forth in the Final Act,
that, governed by the principles and rules of international law, each of the
Contracting Parties retains exclusive power and legal competence,
unaffected by the terms of the Treaty, to grant or deny non-Contracting
Parties transit and transport privileges.
"As regards the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol II not to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties, the
United States Government would have to consider that an armed attack
by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon
State, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party's corresponding
obligations under Article 1 of the Treaty.
"The United States Government considers that the technology of
making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguish-
able from the technology of making nuclear weapons, and that nuclear
weapons and nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes are both
capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and have
the common group of characteristics of large amounts of energy generated
instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore the United States
Government understands the definition contained in Article 5 of the
Treaty as necessarily encompassing all nuclear explosive devices. It is also
understood that Articles 1 and 5 restrict accordingly the activities of the
Contracting Parties under Paragraph 1 of Article 18.
"The United States Government understands that paragraph 4 of
Article 18 of the Treaty permits, and the United States adherence to
Protocol II will not prevent, collaboration by the United States with
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Contracting Parties for the purpose of carrying out explosions of nuclear
devices for peaceful purposes in a manner consistent with a policy of not
contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this
connection, the United States Government notes Article 5 of the Treaty on
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, under which it joined in an
undertaking to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits
of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions would be made available to
non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty, and reaffirms its
willingness to extend such undertakings, on the same basis, to States
precluded by the present Treaty from manufacturing or acquiring any
nuclear explosive device.
"The United States Government also declares that, although not
required by Protocol II, it will act with respect to such territories of
Protocol I adherents as are within the geographical area defined in
Paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Treaty in the same manner as Protocol II
requires it to act with respect to the territories of Contracting Parties".
6
France was the third country to sign this Protocol. It made the
following declaration on signing, on 18 July 1973:
"1. The French Government interprets the undertaking in Article 3 of the
Protocol as not preventing the full exercise of the right to legitimate self-
defense as contained in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.
"2. The French Government takes note of the Preparatory Commission's
interpretation of the Treaty, as set forth in the Final Act, that, governed by
the rules and principles of international law, each of the Contracting
Parties retains exclusive power and legal competence, unaffected by the
terms of the Treaty, to grant or deny transit or transport privileges.
"3. The French Government considers the reference in Article 3 of the
Treaty to "its own legislation" to relate only to such legislation as is
compatible with the rules of international law.
"4. The provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol apply to the text of
the Treaty of Tlatelolco as it existed at the time of the French
Government's signing of the Protocol. Consequently, the French
Government would not recognize any amendment to that Treaty which
entered into force, in accordance with Article 29 of the Treaty, unless it
had given its express consent.
"5. In the event of this interpretative declaration by the French
Government being challenged, in whole or in part, by one or several
Contracting Parties to the Treaty or to Protocol II, these instruments
would be deemed to be without effect in the relations between the
Republic of France and the challenging State or States."
France ratified on 22 March 1974, and on that occasion reiterated the
declaration it had made on signing. It made a further declaration shortly
afterwards, on April 15 1974:
"The French Government is prepared to consider that the undertakings
entered into under Protocol II to the Treaty on the denuclearization of
6. For an analysis of these declarations, see: Davis R. Robinson, The Treaty of Tlatelolco and
the United States, in the American Journal of International Law, Vol. 66, No. 2, 1970.
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Latin America apply not only to Parties signatory to the Treaty, but also
to the territories for which the commitment to implement the statute of
denuclearization, in accordance with Article 11 of Protocol I, has entered
into force".
7
10. The fourth nuclear power to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II
was the People's Republic of China. I have already referred to that
declaration, which is of a political rather than a legal or interpretative
character, in paragraph 5 above.
11. The fifth and final nuclear power to sign and ratify Additional
Protocol II was the Soviet Union. On 18 May 1978, on signing, the
Soviet Government made the following declaration:
"As a consistent advocate of the establishment of nuclear-free zones in
various parts of the world and desiring to support the efforts of the Latin
American States along these lines, the Soviet Government has decided to
sign Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America (the Tlatelolco Treaty).
"In signing Additional Protocol II to the Tlatelolco Treaty, the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics deems it necessary
to state the following:
"I. The Soviet Union proceeds from the assumption that the effect of
Article 1 of the Treaty extends, as specified in Article 5 of the Treaty, to
any nuclear explosive device and that, accordingly, the carrying out by any
Party to the Treaty of explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes
would be a violation of its obligations under Article 1 and would be
incompatible with its non-nuclear status. For States parties to the Treaty
a solution to the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions can be found in
accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of the Treaty on the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons and within the framework of the
international procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
"2. In signing Additional Protocol II, the Soviet Union proceeds from
the assumption that at present the zone of application of the Treaty
comprises the territories for which it is in force as provided in Article 4(1)
of the Treaty. The signing of Additional Protocol II by the Soviet Union
does not in any way signify recognition of the possibility of the force of the
Treaty as provided in Article 4(2) being extended beyond the territories of
the States parties to the Treaty, including air space and territorial waters as
defined in accordance with international law.
"3. With regard to the reference in Article 3 of the Treaty to "its own
legislation" in connection with the territorial waters, air space and any
other space over which the States parties to the Treaty exercise
sovereignty, the signing of Additional Protocol II by the Soviet Union
does not signify recognition of their claims to the exercise of sovereignty
which are contrary to generally accepted standards of international law.
"4. The Soviet Union takes note of the interpretation of the Treaty given
in the Final Act of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization
7. H6ctor Gros Espiell, La signature du trait de Tlatelolco par la Chine et la France, op cit,
note 3, above.
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of Latin America to the effect that the transport of nuclear weapons by the
Parties to the Treaty is covered by the prohibitions envisaged in Article 1
of the Treaty.
"5. The Final Act of the Preparatory Commission for the Denucleari-
zation of Latin America includes an interpretation of the Treaty to the
effect that the granting of permission for the transit of nuclear weapons at
the request of States not parties to the Treaty lies within the competence
of each individual State party to the Treaty. In this connection the Soviet
Union reaffirms its position that authorizing the transit of nuclear weapons
in any form would be contrary to the objectives of the Treaty, according
to which, as specially mentioned in the Preamble, Latin America must be
completely free from nuclear weapons, and that it would be incompatible
with the non-nuclear status of the States parties to the Treaty and with
their obligations as laid down in Article 1 thereof.
"6. Any actions undertaken by a State party to, or States party to, the
Tlatelolco Treaty, which are not compatible with their non-nuclear status,
and also the commission by one or more States parties to the Treaty of an
act of aggression with the support of a State which is in possession of
nuclear weapons or together with such a State, will be regarded by the
Soviet Union as incompatible with the obligations of those countries under
the Treaty. In such cases the Soviet Union reserves the right to reconsider
its obligations under Additional Protocol II.
"7. The Soviet Union states that the provisions of the articles of Additional
Protocol II are applicable to the text of the Treaty for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in the wording of the Treaty at the
time of the signing of the Protocol by the Government of the Soviet
Union, due account being taken of the position of the Soviet Union as set
out in the present statement. In this connection, any amendment to the
Treaty entering into force in accordance with the provisions of Articles 29
and 6 of the Treaty without the clearly expressed approval of the Soviet
Union shall have no force as far as the Soviet Union is concerned". 8
The Supreme Soviet reiterated this declaration on 12 December 1978
and also added the following:
"The Soviet Union affirms that the obligations accepted by it in
accordance with Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco also extend to
those territories to which denuclearized zone status applies, in accordance
with Additional Protocol I of the Treaty.
"Moreover, the Soviet Union reaffirms its position with respect to the
granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, in accordance
8. This "declaration" contains practically all the elements or viewpoints which the Soviet
Union had expressed in previous years as grounds for preventing it from signing the Treaty of
Tlatelolco. In this connection, see: Hector Gros Espiell, Comentario sobre los criterios
expuestos por la Union Sovitica como fundamento de su negativa a firmar el Protocolo 1I, in
El Tratado de Tiatelolco: algunas consideraciones sobre aspectos espectficos, op cit When,
following lengthy negotiations, the Soviet Union's decision to sign was announced by President
Brezhnev on 18 April 1978, the declaration made was aimed at safeguarding the essence of
those principles which had been traditionally supported by the Soviet Union.
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with the United Nations Declaration on this question (General Assembly
resolution 1415 (XV) of 14 December 1960)."
I have already referred to paragraph 2 of this declaration and I have
stressed its essentially political character. Paragraph 1 is comparable to
similar texts to be found in the declarations of the United Kingdom, the
United States, and in the French supplementary declaration of 15 April
1974. Reference is made to the situation of territories which are within
the zone of application of the Treaty, but which are de jure or de facto
under the jurisdiction of extra-continental powers.
VI.
12. The substance and issues contained in or raised by the foregoing
declarations can be classified as follows:
[A.] Several documents issued by powers when signing and ratifying
Protocol II raise the question of the zone of application of the Treaty,
doubtless a subject of the utmost importance to them, since the criteria
they put forward will form the basis of the spatial application of the
Treaty, as they recognize it. Indeed, the Treaty not only applies to land
and air space, but also to the territorial waters of the States party to it,
and, upon fulfillment of the requirements of Article 28, paragraph 1, the
provisions of Article 4, paragraph 2, mean that it would apply to that
overall area, which is considerably greater than the sum total of the
territorial area of the States party to the Treaty.
This explains why the issue is of keen interest to non-contracting
States. The matter has mainly been discussed from two viewpoints;
firstly, that of the concept of territory, defined as follows by Article 3 of
the Treaty: "For the purposes of this Treaty, the term "territory" shall
include the territorial sea, air space and any other space over which the
State exercises sovereignty in accordance with its own legislation".
Great Britain, on signing protocols I and II, had this to say: "(a) The
reference in Article 3 of the Treaty to "its own legislation" relates only to
such legislation as is compatible with the rules of international law and
involves an exercise of sovereignty consistent with those rules, and
accordingly that signature or ratification of either Additional Protocol by
the Government of the United Kingdom could not be regarded as
implying recognition of any legislation which did not, in their view,
comply with the relevant rules of international law".
On ratifying Protocol II the United States expressed similar concepts
in paragraph I of its declaration: "The United States Government
understands the reference in Article 3 of the Treaty to "its own
legislation" to relate only to such legislation as is compatible with the
rules of international law and as involves an exercise of sovereignty
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consistent with those rules, and accordingly that ratification of Additional
Protocol II by the United States Government could not be regarded as
implying recognition, for the purpose of this Treaty and its Protocols, or
for any other purpose, of any legislation which did not, in the view of the
United States, comply with the relevant rules of international law".
France did likewise in paragraph 3 of its declaration on signing
Protocol II: "The French Government understands the reference in
Article 3 of the Treaty to "its own legislation" to relate only to such
legislation as is compatible with the rules of international law."
The Soviet Union referred to the same question, in similar terms, in
paragraph 3 of its declaration on signing Protocol II: "With regard to the
reference in Article 3 of the Treaty to "its own legislation" in connection
with the territorial waters, air space and any other space over which the
States parties to the treaty exercise sovereignty, the signing of Additional
Protocol II by the Soviet Union does not signify recognition of their
claims to the exercise of sovereignty which are contrary to generally
accepted standards of international law".
A second issue raised in the various declarations relates to the status of
the zone defined in paragraph 2 of Article 4, which states:
"Upon fulfillment of the requirements of Article 28, paragraph 1, the zone
of application of this Treaty shall also be that which is situated in the
western hemisphere within the following limits (except the continental
part of the territory of the United States of America and its territorial
waters): starting at a point located at 350 latitude, 750 longitude; from this
point directly southward to a point at 300 north latitude, 750 west
longitude; from there, directly eastward to a point at 300 north latitude,
500 west longitude; from there, along a loxodromic line to a point at 50
north latitude, 200 west longitude; from there, directly southward to a
point at 60' south latitude, 200 west longitude; from there, directly
westward to a point at 600 south latitude, 1150 west longitude, from there,
directly northward to a point at 00 latitude, 1150 west longitude; from
there, along a loxodromic line to a point at 350 north latitude, 1500 west
longitude; from there, directly eastward to a point at 350 north latitude,
750 west longitude."
The Soviet declaration, made on signing Protocol II, states in its
paragraph 2: "In signing Additional Protocol II, the Soviet Union
proceeds from the assumption that at present the zone of application of
the Treaty comprises the territories for which it is in force as provided in
Article 4(1) of the Treaty. The signing of Additional Protocol II by the
Soviet Union does not in any way signify recognition of the possibility of
the force of the Treaty as provided in Article 4(2) being extended beyond
the territories of the States parties of the Treaty, including air space and
territorial waters as defined in accordance with international law."
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[B.] Most of the declarations made on signing and/or ratifying
Protocol II refer to the question of the transit of nuclear weapons over the
territory of the Contracting Parties to the Treaty. Before referring to the
content of the various declarations on this matter, to put the issue in
perspective, it would be useful to recall that the Treaty does not refer
expressly to the question of transit as such, be it to authorise or to deny
it. Although this deliberate omission has left the interpretative problem
unsettled, it enables one to distinguish, on the one hand, between transit
of nuclear weapons of non-Contracting Parties over the territory of
Contracting Parties, and, on the other, transit over their own territory of
nuclear weapons which, for whatever reason, they have in their
possession. Such transport would obviously be a violation of Article 1 of
the Treaty, since, if one cannot possess or acquire nuclear weapons by
any means whatsoever, nor deploy them directly or indirectly, it follows
that one has no right to transport them.
During the final session of the preparatory commission for the
denuclearization of Latin America, shortly before the draft of the Treaty
was completed, the following declaration was unanimously approved:
"The Commission deemed it unnecessary to include the term "transport"
in Article 1, concerning "Obligations", for the following reasons: 1. If the
carrier is one of the Contracting Parties, transport is covered by the
prohibitions expressly laid down in the remaining provisions of Article 1
and there is no need to mention it expressly, since the Article prohibits
"any form of possession of any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by
the Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way".
2. If the carrier is a State not a Party to the treaty, transport is identical
with "transit" which, in the absence of any provision in the Treaty, must
be understood to be governed by the principles and rules of international
law; according to these principles and rules it is for the territorial State, in
the free exercise of its sovereignty, to grant or deny permission for such
transit in each individual case, upon application by the State interested in
effecting the transit, unless some other arrangement has been reached in a
Treaty between such States". (COPREDAL/ 76, S. 8, UN doc. A/6663).
On signing protocol II on April 1st 1968, the United States declared
as follows in paragraph 2 of their statement: "The United States
Government takes note of the preparatory commission's interpretation of
the Treaty, as set forth in the final act, that, governed by the principles
and rules of international law, each of the Contracting Parties retains
exclusive power and legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the
Treaty, to grant or deny non-Contracting Parties transport and transit
privileges." The United States reiterated these ideas upon ratifying the
Protocol, on May 12 1971.
The Treaty concerning the Permanent Neutrality and the Operation of
the Panama Canal, signed on September 7 1977 between the United
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States and Panama, accepts this interpretation, since both Parties allow
transit through the canal of nuclear propulsion vessels with or without
nuclear weapons on board, and also that of conventionally propelled
vessels carrying nuclear weapons, in accordance with the terms and
within the limits defined in Article 2. In the rest of the territory of the
Republic of Panama, including the so-called Canal Zone, recognised by
the United States as Panamanian territory in this Treaty, by virtue of the
Treaty of Tlatelolco, to which Panama is a Party, none of the activities
prohibited by Article 1 of the latter Treaty can be carried out. This is by
virtue of paragraph 6 of Article IV of the Agreement for the
implementation of Article IV of the Treaty on the Panama Canal.9
Transit of such weapons is not authorised on Panamanian territory, with
the exception of the canal itself, since, by virtue of a previous public
declaration, Panama had prohibited it. Mexico has also prohibited the
transit of nuclear weapons on its territory.
When the French Government signed Protocol II on 18 July 1973, it
stated in paragraph 2 of its declaration that: "The French Government
takes note of the preparatory commission's interpretation of the Treaty, as
set forth in the final act, that, governed by the principles and rules of
international law, each of the Contracting Parties retains exclusive power
and legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the Treaty, to grant or
deny transit and transport privileges".
When the Soviet Union signed on 18 May 1978, it stated in
paragraphs 4 and 5 of its declaration:
"The Soviet Union takes note of the interpretation of the Treaty given in
the final act of the preparatory commission for the denuclearization of
Latin America to the effect that the transport of nuclear weapons by the
Parties to the Treaty is covered by the prohibitions envisaged in Article 1
of the Treaty.
"The final act of the preparatory commission for the denuclearization of
Latin America includes an interpretation of the Treaty to the effect that the
granting of permission for the transit of nuclear weapons at the request of
States not Parties to the Treaty lies within the competence of each
individual State Party to the Treaty. In this connection the Soviet Union
reaffirms its position that authorising the transit of nuclear weapons in any
form would be contrary to the objectives of the Treaty, according to
which, as specially mentioned in the Preamble, Latin America must be
completely free from nuclear weapons, and that it would be incompatible
with the non-nuclear status of the States Parties to the Treaty and with
their obligations as laid down in Article 1 thereof".
9. See: Hkctor Gros Espiell; Los Tratados sobre el Canal de Panamdy la Zona Libre de Armas
Nucleares en la Amirica latina, in Cuademos de Derecho Publico, No. 4, Universidad de los
Andes, Venezuela; pp. 174 and 183.
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Paragraph 4 of the Soviet declaration refers not to transit but to transport,
as defined earlier in this article. As for paragraph 5, the interpretation
given by the Soviet Union is diametrically opposed to the one given by
the United States and France. Despite this radical difference in
interpretation regarding the legal possibility or impossibility of non-
Contracting Parties to transport nuclear weapons on the territory of
Contracting Parties, the Depository Government, on receiving these
documents with their conflicting interpretations, did not react, nor did
any of the Contracting Parties when they received the text of these
declarations. The interpretative discrepancy between the United States
and France, on the one hand, and the USSR on the other, did not give
rise to any controversy at the time. Should any formal controversy arise
concerning the interpretation of the Treaty, Article 24 might be brought
into play, as it states that any question or dispute relating to the
interpretation of the Treaty which has not been settled may be referred to
the International Court of Justice, with the prior consent of the parties to
the controversy. It is noteworthy that although China made no
interpretative declaration on this matter, it pointed out that it should be
required that the undertaking to "prohibit the passage of all nuclear
weapons carrying means over the territory, the territorial waters, and the
air space of Latin America" should be respected and fulffiled.
[C.] Several of the documents also refer to the question of nuclear
explosions for peaceful purposes.
The United Kingdom, in its declaration on signing the two Protocols,
reiterated on ratification, stated the following: "(b) Article 18 of the
Treaty, when read in conjunction with Articles 1 and 5 thereof, would
not permit the Contracting Parties to the Treaty to carry out explosions
of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes unless and until advances in
technology have made possible the development of devices for such
explosions which are not capable of being used for weapons purposes".
The argument expressed by the United States is similar, albeit fuller, as
given in its declaration upon signing Additional Protocol II: "The United
States Government considers that the technology of making nuclear
explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the
technology of making nuclear weapons, and that nuclear weapons and
nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes are both capable of
releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and have the
common group of characteristics of large amounts of energy generated
instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore the United States
Government understands the definition contained in Article 5 of the
Treaty as necessarily encompassing all nuclear explosive devices. It is also
understood that Articles 1 and 5 restrict accordingly the activities of the
Contracting Parties under Paragraph 1 of Article 18".
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The following paragraph adds a concept which is not to be found in
the U.K. declaration:
"The United States Government understands that Paragraph 4 of Article
18 of the Treaty permits, and the United States adherence to Protocol II
will not prevent, collaboration by the United States with Contracting
Parties for the purpose of carrying out explosions of nuclear devices for
peaceful purposes in a manner consistent with a policy of not contributing
to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this connection, the
United States Government notes Article 5 of the Treaty on the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons, under which it joined in an undertaking
to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits of peaceful
applications of nuclear explosions would be made available to non-
nuclear-weapon States Party to that Treaty, and reaffirms its willingness to
extend such an undertaking, on the same basis, to States precluded by the
present Treaty from manufacturing or acquiring any nuclear explosive
device".
The above was reiterated, unchanged, on ratification. The basic idea
expressed in the earlier paragraph was also repeated, although the latter
part of it is more precisely worded.
The French declaration made on signing Protocol II makes no
reference to this matter.
The Soviet Union, however, on signing, expressed in its first paragraph
concepts similar to those found in the United Kingdom and United States
declarations:
"The Soviet Union proceeds from the assumption that the effect of Article
1 of the Treaty extends, as specified in Article 5 of the Treaty, to any
nuclear explosive device and that, accordingly, the carrying out by any
Party to the Treaty of explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes
would be a violation of its obligations under Article 1 and would be
incompatible with its non-nuclear status. For States Party to the Treaty a
solution to the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions can be found in
accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and within the framework of the
international procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency".
[D.] With regard to the right to defend oneself against an act of
aggression by a Contracting Party to the Treaty with the assistance or
support of a nuclear-weapons State, several States made explicit
declarations on this matter. In such an event it is taken for granted that
should such aggression involve nuclear weapons, self-defense, including
recourse to nuclear weapons, would be permissible and that the attacked
State would be freed from its obligations under Additional Protocol 11.10
10. HWctor Gros Espiell; En torno al Tratado de Tlatelolcoy la desnuclearizacidn militar de la
Ambrica Laina;v OPANAL, Mexico, pp. 14-16.
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On signing, the United Kingdom stated the following on this issue:
"(d) (... )the Government of the United Kingdom would, in the event of
any act of aggression by a Contracting Party to the Treaty in which that
Party was supported by a nuclear-weapon State, be free to reconsider the
extent to which they could be regarded as committed by the provisions
of Additional Protocol II".
The United States expressed a similar notion on signing and on
ratifying: "As regards the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol II not to
use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties,
the United States Government would have to consider that an armed
attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-
weapon State, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party's
corresponding obligations under Article 1 of the Treaty".
France declared that: "The French government regards the
undertaking in Article 3 of the Protocol as not preventing the full exercise
of the right to self-defense, as enshrined in Article 5 of the United Nations
Charter".
On signing, the Soviet Union expressed similar views: "Any actions
undertaken by a State Party to, or States Parties to, the Tlatelolco Treaty
which are not compatible with their non-nuclear status, and also the
commission by one or more States Parties to the Treaty of an act of
aggression with the support of a State which is in possession of nuclear
weapons or together with such a State, will be regarded by the Soviet
Union as incompatible with the obligations of those countries under the
Treaty. In such cases the Soviet Union reserves the right to reconsider its
obligations under Additional Protocol II. The Soviet Union further
reserves the right to reconsider its attitude to Additional Protocol II in the
event of any actions on the part of other States possessing nuclear
weapons which are incompatible with their obligations under the said
Protocol".
[E.] Several declarations refer to the possibility of future reforms of the
Treaty of Tlatelolco itself and to their likely effects on Parties to the
Protocols.
Paragraph 4 of the French declaration, made on signing Protocol II,
states that: "The provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol shall apply
to the text of the Treaty of Tlatelolco as it was at the time of the signing
of the Protocol by the French Government. Consequently, any
amendment to the Treaty entering into force in accordance with the
provisions of Article 29 of the Treaty without the clearly expressed
approval of the French Government shall have no force as far as France
is concerned".
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Paragraph 7 of the Soviet declaration on signing Protocol II states:
"The Soviet Government states that the provisions of the articles of
Additional Protocol II are applicable to the text of the Treaty for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in the wording of the
Treaty at the time of the signing of the Protocol by the Government of the
Soviet Union, due account being taken of the position of the Soviet
Union as set out in the present statement. In this connection, any
amendment to the Treaty entering into force in accordance with the
provisions of Articles 29 and 6 of the Treaty without the clearly expressed
approval of the Soviet Union shall have no force as far as the Soviet
Union is concerned".
No reference is made to this question in the declarations by the United
States, Great Britain or China.
[El When the United Kingdom made a combined declaration on
signing both Protocols I and II, it stated its position with regard to the
territories in the American area, and although it referred to "signature or
ratification of either Additional Protocol", its statement is clearly and
specifically linked to the likely effects of its accession to Protocol I.
Paragraph (c) of its declaration is worded as follows: Signature or
ratification of either Additional Protocol by the Government of the
United Kingdom could not be regarded as affecting in any way the legal
status of any territory for the international relations of which they are
responsible lying within the limits of the geographical zone established by
the Treaty".
[G.] Several declarations dealt with obligations with regard to
territories situated within the zone of application of the Treaty, which,
although not belonging to Contracting Parties to the Treaty, are
Territories administered dejure or defacto by States Party to Additional
Protocol I.
By direct application of the Treaty, such territories would not be
covered by the guarantees which stem from the obligations incumbent on
States Party to Protocol II. Indeed, the obligations of States Party to
Protocol II refer expressis verbis only to States Party to the Treaty itself.
That is why the United States, France, Great Britain and the Soviet
Union declared that the obligations entered into by themselves, as parties
to Additional Protocol II, shall apply to those territories possessed by
States Party to Additional Protocol I." The final paragraph of the United
States declaration made on signing Additional Protocol I states: "That the
United States Government also declares that, although not required by
11. Hctor Gros Espiell; La desnuclearizatidn de la Amirica Latina y los territorios
latinoamericanos en posesidn de potencias extracontinentales, in El Tratado de Tiatelolco:
algunas consideraciones sobre aspectos especficos; OPANAL, 1976, pp. 19-31.
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Protocol II, it will act with respect to such territories of Protocol I
adherents as are within the geographical area defined in paragraph 2 of
Article 4 of the Treaty in the same manner as Protocol II requires it to act
with respect to the territories of Contracting Parties". This principle was
reiterated in the declaration made on ratifying the Protocol.
Great Britain stated the following in the final paragraph of its
combined declaration made on signing both Protocols: "I have the
honour further to declare that the Government of the United Kingdom
are prepared to regard their undertaking under Article 3 of Additional
Protocol II not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the
Contracting Parties to the Treaty as extending not only to those Parties
but also to territories in respect of which the undertaking to apply the
statute of denuclearisation, in accordance with Article 1 of Additional
Protocol I, becomes effective. That the United Kingdom Government
also declares that, although not required by Protocol II, it will act with
respect to such territories of Protocol I adherents as are within the
geographical area defined in Paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Treaty in the
same manner as Protocol II requires it to act with respect to the territories
of Contracting Parties".
France remained silent on this question in its declarations on signing
and on ratifying Protocol II. It did make a further declaration on 15 April
1974 which refers to this matter, in terms similar to those of the United
States and United Kingdom declarations. The Soviet Union made no
allusion to this issue on signing Protocol II, but on ratifying it made a
declaration similar to that of the United States, France, and Great Britain.
VII.
I have already pointed out that reservations are not permitted in the case
of Additional Protocol II. I do, however, find elements in some
interpretative declarations made at the time of signing and/or ratifying
this Protocol that arguably constitute genuine reservations.
The final paragraph of the French declaration states that: "In the event
of this interpretative declaration by the French Government being
challenged in whole or in part by one or several Contracting Parties to
the Treaty or to Protocol II, these instruments would cease to have any
effect in the relations between the Republic of France and the challenging
State or States". This text, which clearly makes the French declaration
into a potential reservation, was not challenged either in whole or in part
by any one or several Contracting Parties to the Treaty or to Protocol II.
An analysis of this text leads me to the conclusion that "by virtue of
a conflict of interpretation posed by the challenge, the legal effects of the
Treaty as applied to France and to the State or States challenging the
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declaration made by the former on July 18 1973 are annuled". 2 Thus the
French declaration is potentially tantamount to a genuine reservation.
The same applied to paragraph 2 of the Soviet declaration, in so far as it
does not recognise the zone referred to in Article 4(2) as applying beyond
the sum total of the territories of the Contracting Parties. The Depository
Government expressed no opinion on the matter on those two occasions.
14. As regards Additional Protocol I, the declarations that have been
made to date are all of a legal or interpretative nature, quite unlike the
totally political type of declaration made by the People's Republic of
China on signing Additional Protocol II.
The "declarations" - so named - made by the United Kingdom and
the Netherlands, do not appear, either formally or in name at least, to be
reservations. This does not of course preclude them from constituting
actual reservations, as defined by the Vienna Convention, by virtue of
their content or the purpose pursued. The document submitted by the
French Government, on the other hand, when signing Protocol I on 2
March 1979, states that it contains "declarations and reservations",
without specifying which paragraphs are declarations and which
reservations. I will venture an opinion on that question when I come to
examine that text in detail.
VIII.
15. The first country to sign and ratify Additional Protocol I was the
United Kingdom, which made declarations on these occasions. The latter
are reproduced in paragraph 6 of this paper, above. Following ratification
of Additional Protocol I by Great Britain (11 December 1969), some of
the territories in the list appended by the British Government, specifying
the territories to which Protocol I would apply, gained independence.
This was the case with Granada, which signed on 29 April 1975 and
ratified on 20 June 1975, and the Bahamas, which signed on 29
November 1976 and ratified on 26 April 1977. They ratified with a
waiver of the requirements laid down in Article 28 of the Treaty, and
thereby automatically became parties to the Treaty and members of
OPANAL.
In fulfillment of Article 25, paragraph 1(b) of the Treaty of Tlatelolco,
the General Conference passed resolutions inviting these states to sign
and ratify the Treaty, which was seen as one way of fulfilling the
admission requirement referred to in the above-mentioned provision
(Resolutions 46 (III) and 80 (IV) ). In the case of the Bahamas, once the
12. Wctor Gros Espiell; Las "declaraciones interpretativas"y el Tratado de Tlatelolco, op cit,
pp. 19-31.
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obstacle raised by its initial claim that it considered itself as already
bound by the Treaty of Tlatelolco had been overcome, signature took
place on 29 November 1976 and ratification (with waiver) on 26 April
1977. The Bahamas had argued its claim on the basis of the applicability
of the rule of succession of states in treaty matters, but the principle was
rejected. 13 When the Bahamas finally signed, the General Conference
invited that state to become a Contracting Party to the Treaty of
Tlatelolco (Resolution 80, c (IV)).
16. The second country to sign and ratify Additional Protocol I was
the Netherlands, which made the following declaration on signing (15
March 1968): "No provision of the Additional Protocol I shall be
interpreted as prejudicing the position of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
as regards its recognition or non-recognition of the rights of or claims to
sovereignty of the Parties to the Treaty, or of the grounds on which such
claims are made. No provision of the Protocol shall be interpreted as
implying that, with respect to the carrying out of nuclear explosions for
peaceful purposes on the territory of Surinam and the Netherlands
Antilles, other rules apply than those operative for the Parties to the
Treaty". This declaration was repeated on ratifying Protocol I on 26 July
1971.
Surinam, which had belonged to the Netherlands, became an
independent state on 25 November 1975. It signed the Treaty on 13
February 1976 and ratified it with a waiver of the Article 28
requirements on 10 June 1977. The General Conference had invited
Surinam to become a Party to the Treaty in its resolution 86 (IV).
17. The United States was the third country to sign Additional
Protocol I. This signature was the fruit of long and complex negotiations
which had been resumed under the impetus of the Government of
President Carter14. No declaration was made at the time of signing. The
Senate was requested to ratify in May 1978. The instrument of
ratification was deposited on 23 November 1981, following approval by
the Senate given on 13 November 1981. Ratification by the United States
was made subject to the following "understandings":
13. Hctor Gros Espiell; La desnuclearizacidn militar de la Amdrica Latina y la sucesidn de
Estados en materia de tratados; in: El Tratado de Tlatelolco: algunas consideraciones sobre
aspectos especfcos; OPANAL, 1976, pp. 19-3 1.
14. H&ctor Gros Espiell: USA e denuclearizzazione nell'America Latina in: Rivista di Studie
Politici Internazionali, Anno XLIV, No. 4, Florence, 1977. President Carter's support for the
Treaty of Tlatelolco was one of the fundamental points of his foreign policy; see the message
by the Government of the United States on the tenth anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco,
14 February 1977, and the speech delivered by President Carter to the O.A.S., on 14 April
1977, as well as the speech by the United States observer to the General Conference of
OPANAL, April 1977, and the article by President Carter: Las relaciones interamericanas: los
desafyos que enfrentamos (Selecciones del Reader's Digest, February 1979, pp. 1-3).
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"1) That the provisions of the Treaty made applicable by this Additional
Protocol do not affect the exclusive power and legal competence under
international law of a State adhering to this Protocol to grant or deny
transit and transport privileges to its own or any other vessels or aircraft
irrespective of cargo or armaments.
"2) That the provisions of the Treaty made applicable by this Additional
Protocol do not affect rights under international law of a State adhering to
this Protocol regarding the exercise of the freedom of the seas, or regarding
passage through or over waters subject to the sovereignty of a State.
"3) That the understandings and declarations attached by the United
States to its ratification of Additional Protocol II apply also to its
ratification of Additional Protocol I".
As a consequence of the United States being party to Protocol I, the
statute of denuclearization of the Treaty of Tlatelolco applies to
Guantanamo, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico.
The so-called Canal Zone, Panamanian territory which will gradually
be transferred to the jurisdiction of that country, has been denuclearized,
legally speaking, since the entry into force of the Panama Canal treaty of
1977 (Agreement for the implementation of Article IV of the Panama
Canal Treaty, Article IV, paragraph 6), although both OPANAL and the
Government of Panama had understood this to be the case earlier, on the
basis of the very statute of the zone and the fact that Panama is a party
to the Treaty of Tlatelolco' 5.
18. France signed on March 1st 1979. This signature, which was also
the fruit of difficult and protracted negotiations, was announced by
President Giscard d'Estaing in his address to the special session of the
General Assembly of the United Nations on disarmament, in May 1978.
The signing, by Foreign Minister Jean Frangois-Poncet, took place in
Mexico during the visit there of President Giscard d'Estaing.1
6
On signing, the French Government submitted their "reservations and
interpretative declarations", which stated the following:
"The French Government, because of the fact that the French territories
situated within the zone of application of the Treaty for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America are an integral part of the French
Republic, can only sign Additional Protocol I to that Treaty in its capacity
as power with de jure responsibility for those territories. It expects the
Governments party to the Treaty, within the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, to take note of the fact
that it is entering into obligations under that Protocol only in that capacity.
15. H&ctor Gros Espiell; Los Tratados sobre el Canal de Panamady la Zona Libre de Armas
Nucleares en la Amdrica Latina, in Cuadernos de Derecho Publico, No. 4, Universidad de los
Andes, Mrida, 1978.
16. H6ctor Gros Espiell: Francia y los estados Unidos y el Protocolo I, in El Tratado de
Tiatelolco, algunas consideraciones sobre aspectos especficos, OPANAL, Mexico, 1976,
pp. 14-15.
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"The French Government, on signing Additional Protocol I to the
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, and
subject to the fulfillment by France of the necessary constitutional
requirements for its entry into force, expresses the following reservations
and makes the following interpretative declarations:
"1. No provision of the said Protocol or of the Articles of the Treaty can
affect the full exercise of the right to legitimate self-defence as stated in
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.
"2. In accordance with Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Treaty, the zone of
application covered by the undertakings entered into under the Treaty is
made up of the whole of the territories defined in Article 3 of the Treaty,
it being understood that the legislation referred to in the said Article must
comply with international law. The French Government holds that any
more extensive zone, especially that which is envisaged in Article 4,
paragraph 2 of the Treaty, cannot be considered to be established in
accordance with international law and consequently it cannot accept that
the Treaty apply to it.
"3. The French Government does not accept that the obligations under
Protocol I, which refer to Articles 1 and 13 of the Treaty, apply to the
transit, over the territories of the French Republic situated within the zone
of the Treaty, and en route for other territories of the French Republic, of
devices as defined in Article 5 of the treaty.
"4. The French Government, in subscribing, by virtue of its acceptance of
Article I of Protocol I, to the obligations defined in Article 1 of the Treaty,
considers that these obligations shall apply exclusively to the activities
listed in that Article which are undertaken in the French territories in
respect of which Protocol I was signed. It cannot accept that such
obligations be interpreted as restricting in any way participation by the
populations of these territories in such activities outside the zone, or their
participation in the national defence effort of the French Republic.
"5. The provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol apply to the Treaty
in the wording at the time of the French Government's signing of the
Protocol. Consequently, no amendment to the Treaty, entering into force
in accordance with Article 28, will apply to France without the clearly
expressed consent of the latter".
Ix.
The issues addressed in these declarations or reservations by States which
have signed and/or ratified Additional Protocol I are the following:
A. The unalterable status of territories belonging dejure or defacto to
States party to Protocol I is raised in the United Kingdom declaration
made on signing, which I have already transcribed, and in the
Netherlands declaration, which reads as follows: "No provisions of the
Additional Protocol I shall be interpreted as prejudicing the position of
the Kingdom of the Netherlands as regards its recognition or non-
recognition of the rights of or claims to sovereignty of the Parties to the
Treaty, or of the grounds on which such claims are made".
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B. On ratifying, the United Kingdom listed those territories to which
the conditions of Additional Protocol I would apply.
C. On signing Additional Protocol I, the Netherlands referred to the
question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes: "No provision of
the Protocol shall be interpreted as implying that, with respect to the
carrying out of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes on the territory
of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, other rules apply than those
operative for the Parties to the Treaty".
D. As for the de jure or de facto situation of the administered
territories, the French Government stated the following on signing
Protocol I: "The French Government, because of the fact that the French
territories situated within the zone of application of the Treaty for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America are an integral part of
the French Republic, can only sign Additional Protocol I to that treaty in
its capacity as power with de jure responsibility for those territories. It
expects the Governments signatory to the Treaty, within the Organisation
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, to take note
of the fact that it is entering into the obligations under the Protocol only
in that capacity".
In order that the Contracting Parties to the Treaty should take special
note of this point contained in the French declaration, the General
Secretary reproduced this paragraph in his report to the Sixth Ordinary
Part-Session of the General Conference of OPANAL (Doc. CG/182,
para. 22). It should be pointed out, however, that in accordance with the
conclusions of the travaux priparatoires for Additional Protocol I, for
Latin American countries "the fact of a Party to Additional Protocol I
exercising authority, dejure or defacto, over a given territory in no way
prejudices the political status of that territory". 17 Although at the present
time there has been no Latin American claim with regard to those
territories, nor any internationally recognised appeal for the right to self-
determination by the peoples inhabiting these territories, the States Party
to the Treaty of Tlatelolco have not accepted, as a consequence of the
French declaration, that the jurisdiction exercised by France over these
territories is necessarily exercised dejure
E. On the question of the right to self-defence, the French Government
made a declaration expressly concerning that matter, which is similar to
the one made on signing Additional Protocol I.
F With regard to the zone of application of the Treaty, The French
Government stated the following on signing Protocol I: "In accordance
with Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Treaty, the zone of application of the
17. Hfctor Gros Espiell, note on the traveauxpriparatoires of Article 1, Additional Proto-
col 1.
252 The Dalhousie Law Journal
undertakings entered into under the said Treaty is made up of the whole
of the territories defined in Article 3 of the Treaty, it being understood
that the legislation referred to in the said Article must comply with the
rules of international law. The signing of Protocol I by the French
Republic does not in any way signify recognition of the possibility of the
force of the Treaty as provided in Article 4 (2) being extended beyond the
territories of the States parties to the Treaty".
The first sentence is similar to paragraph 3 of the declaration made on
signing Protocol II. The second sentence, however, is new, and is
comparable to paragraph 2 of the Soviet declaration on signing
Additional Protocol II. For the reasons that I have already outlined, it
constitutes an actual reservation.
G. On the transit question, the French declaration on signing Protocol
I goes beyond that made on signing Protocol II, and states in paragraph
3: "The French Government does not accept that the obligations under
Protocol I, which refer to Articles 1 and 13 of the Treaty, apply to the
passage, over the territories of the French Republic situated within the
zone of the Treaty, and en route for other territories of the French
Republic, of devices defined in Article 5 of the Treaty". This text, not so
much because it affirms the right of transit over its territories to other
territories of the French republic, but rather because it excludes the
application of Article 13 (concerning the safeguards agreement which
must be negotiated with the IAEA), and Article 1 (which lists the
prohibitions imposed by the Treaty), poses some serious problems.
In essence, it would appear to be a reservation, since, in the case of the
transit under consideration, it excludes the application of two Articles of
the Treaty (1 and 13) to which Protocol I expressly refers, with respect
to the French territories situated within the zone of the Treaty. If transit
of nuclear weapons is to be allowed in the manner indicated in Paragraph
3 of the French declaration, this is tantamount to non-acceptance of the
prohibitions in Article I. The declaration also rules out the possibility of
control derived from the safeguard agreement reached in accordance
with Article 13. This text should therefore be considered to be a
reservation which may even affect the very purpose and object of the
Treaty, namely, to prohibit the activities referred to in Article 1, in the
territories to which that provision applies. This reservation has, however,
not yet been challenged, although arguably the Article 20 principle of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties applies.
H. The French Government also made a very special declaration
which, in my opinion, poses no problem with regard to the application
of the Treaty, from the viewpoint of the interests of the Contracting
Parties and their own objectives. Paragraph 4 states that: "The French
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Government, in subscribing, by virtue of its acceptance of Article I of
Protocol I, to the obligations defined in Article I of the treaty, considers
that these obligations shall apply exclusively to the activities listed in that
Article which are undertaken in the French territories in respect of which
Protocol I was signed. It cannot accept that such obligations be
interpreted as restricting in any way participation by the populations of
these territories in such activities outside the zone, or their participation
in the national defense effort of the French Republic".
I. Finally, as regards possible future reforms of the Treaty, the French
Government made a declaration in paragraph 5 of its document, identical
to that which it made in paragraph 4 of the document submitted on
signing Additional Protocol II.
X.
20. This paper did not set out to give an exhaustive legal or political
analysis of the problems raised by the declarations made on signing or
ratifying Additional Protocols I and II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. I have
confined myself to underlining those legal problems on which I have
expressed a view in earlier studies on the subject. My purpose has been
to publicize texts which, generally speaking, are not very well known,
texts drafted by the powers bound by the treaty of Tlatelolco as a
consequence of their signing and/or ratifying Additional Protocols I and
II, along with some commentaries which aim to highlight the legal and
political issues raised by them.
21. These texts clearly demonstrate how, by committing themselves to
the Treaty of Tlatelolco - for reasons linked to the political necessity or
expediency of supporting the laudabled enterprise of regional nuclear
disarmament, and, incidentally, making a politically valuable gesture
towards the Latin American countries - the Parties involved tried to
ensure that this did not essentially affect their strategic military balance
nor the fundamental aspects of their policies with regard to the arms race.
The States Party to Protocols I and II therefore wished to safeguard their
own viewpoints and principles, on the basis of their own very special
interests, concerning such fundmental issues as, for example, the right to
self-defence in the event of nuclear attack against their extra-continental
territories or those situated in Latin America, in relation to the obligations
which arise from the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as well as the issue of the
transport of nuclear weapons in the Latin American denuclearized zone
set up by the Treaty and the possible extension of that zone, especially
with regard to territorial waters and air space, to mention but a few of the
problems addressed.
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The differing opinions expressed by the Soviet Union and the United
States on the transit of nuclear weapons in the territory of the
denuclearized zone, and the convergent positions of France and the
Soviet Union on the question of the nature of the territorial waters
covered by Article 4(2) of the Treaty, are eloquent examples of the
political and strategic approach reflected in the various declarations.
One of the viewpoints adopted - by the United States - is based on
the fact that it adjoins the territory of Latin America and therefore needed
to ensure possible transit of its nuclear weapons on and across the
Continent. The Soviet Union's viewpoint is based on the fact that its
territory is partly situated in Europe and partly in Asia, and that the
USSR does not have island possessions. Other reasons are that America
is a territorial mass which is separated from Europe and Asia by the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, with the consequent need to safeguard, as
far as possible, the freedom of action of its nuclear weapon-carrying
vessels over these immense stretches of sea and air space, while remaining
opposed to the transport of nuclear weapons on or over the territory of
Latin America. Given the position of their home territories, their island
possessions, and their relation to the Superpowers, it is easy to understand
the stances taken by Great Britain and France, expecially as regards the
territorial waters covered by the Latin American zone and, in the case of
France, the transit of nuclear weapons.
The cases of the Netherlands and that of China are somewhat different.
The Netherlands is the only extra-continental power with territories
under its jurisdiction in America which does not possess nuclear weapons
and which had no colonies or territories under its administration in the
Pacific Ocean. This explains the brevity and noncommittal character of
its declaration on signing Protocol I. China, with no territories in Latin
America, and with the largest part of its home territory confined to one
continent, had no difficulty in committing itself to Additional Protocol II,
while fully respecting its own principles and the demands of the Treaty.
It therefore confined itself to a political statement which summed up the
main guidelines of its foreign policy.
These are examples of particular interest, revealing as they do the
many conflicting opinions, as well as the occasionally concurring
viewpoints, of the States Party to Protocols I and II. Underlying these
differences or similarities of position are different geopolitical, political
and strategic imperatives. In the documents to which I have referred,
these States have attempted to properly safeguard and protect their own
interests - translated into legal terms - in such a way that the
obligations undertaken by them under the Treaty of Tlatelolco should not
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adversely affect the balance of power, nor their overall strategy with
regard to major military issues connected to nuclear disarmament, and,
more particularly, regional nuclear disarmament.
Montevideo, February 1989.
